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RULE 14A-8 AND THE EXCLUSION OF PROPOSALS THAT 
VIOLATE THE LAW 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) 
created Rule 14a-8 in 1942 to allow certain shareholder proposals to be 
included in a company’s proxy statement.1 The Rule also included thirteen 
substantive grounds for excluding a proposal. Specifically, subsection 
(i)(2) allows for the exclusion of proposals “which, if implemented, would 
violate . . . state law or federal law of the United States, or any law of any 
foreign jurisdiction, to which the [company] is subject.”2  
Originally arising from an informal staff interpretation, the Commis-
sion amended Rule 14a-8 in 1976 to add the exclusion.3 The provision 
applied to proposals that necessarily required the corporation to act in a 
manner that would conflict with law. The exclusion did not apply to pro-
posals that could violate the law. Moreover, the SEC sometimes allowed 
shareholders to rewrite a proposal to avoid application of the exclusion.  
This paper will lay out the administrative history of Rule 14a-8(i)(2) 
through the changes made in 1998. The paper will also trace the staff’s 
interpretation of the provision with particular emphasis on interpretations 
during the new millennium. Finally, the paper will analyze the exclusion 
and present possible changes in the staff’s interpretation.  
II.ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY OF SUBSECTION (I)(2) 
A. Evolution of the Exclusion 
When adopted in 1942, Rule 14a-8 did not include an explicit exclu-
sion for proposals that violated the law.4 Nonetheless, the staff adopted an 
informal position that allowed for exclusion in these circumstances. In a 
no action letter issued to American Motors in 1972,5 the staff found that a 
  
 1. Because Rules are adopted pursuant to authority given to an agency under a statute, 14a-8 
was adopted pursuant to authority under the Exchange Act but it  did not involve or require an amend-
ment to the Exchange Act. 
 2. Rule 14a-8(i)(2). 
 3. Prior to Rule 14a-8(i)(2) the was a rule called 14a-8(c)(2) which was given life in the Adop-
tion of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999 (adopted Nov. 22, 
1976). Since the law’s enactment in 1942, the staff had only informally excluded shareholder pro-
posals from proxy materials for violations of the law, but this release prohibited the same violations 
of law formally and adopted only minor changes in language. 
 4. The Commission originally numbered the Rule x-14a-7. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Release 
Notice, Release No. 2376 (Jan. 12, 1940). 
 5. Am. Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 9369, at *4 (Nov. 29, 1972). The pro-
posal sought the right to have shareholders vote “For” or “Against” a matter on the proxy. The com-
pany argued that the proposal would have “unreasonably restrict[ed] the right of a shareholder to vote 
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proposal that would restrict a voter’s right to delegate their proxy con-
flicted with the law of Maryland. Similarly, in a letter to the General Elec-
tric Company6 (“GE”), the staff found that a proposal calling for the com-
pany to breach legal contracts contradicted the law. The staff also permit-
ted the exclusion of proposals that defied foreign law because this contra-
vened state law by causing a corporation to exercise authority “in defiance 
of any statute in a jurisdiction where such company [was] doing busi-
ness.”7 
The staff interpretation only applied when proposals necessitated a 
conflict with the law. In Allis-Chalmers Co.,8 management failed to suffi-
ciently show that the proposal “necessarily required the performance of 
illegal acts. . . .” As a result, the staff decided not to permit exclusion from 
the proxy materials. In another letter issued to Newmont Mining Co.,9 the 
staff refused to permit the exclusion of a proposal that called for the com-
pany to solicit new laws advocating affirmative action in South Africa be-
cause the provision would “require the company to seek new laws only to 
the extent it [was] legally able to do so. . . .”10 
The Commission proposed to add an explicit exclusion for proposals 
“contrary to the federal law of the United States” in 1976.11 The release 
noted that the amendment was consistent with “a view that [the] staff has 
expressed informally on numerous occasions in the past.”12 Commentary 
on the proposal sought expansion to “allow the omission of proposals 
whose implementation would violate not only federal law, but also any 
other applicable law (including foreign law) or governmental regulation to 
which the corporation is subject. . . ”13 
  
by proxy as authorized by statute, so [it] would be invalid and unenforceable under the laws of the 
State of Maryland.” 
 6. General Electric Co., SEC No-Action Letter, CCH Intelliconnect, (Feb. 1, 1973). This pro-
posal called for the “suspension of all military contracts relating to the military action in Southeast 
Asia.” According to the staff, the proposal had the potential to violate the law because it  “would require 
GE to violate federal law by breaching legal contracts, many of which [were] with the American gov-
ernment itself.” 
 7. Newmont Mining Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1973 WL 9174 (March 20, 1973). In this case 
the Newmont Mining Corporation sought exclusion of a shareholder proposal which proposed the 
initiation of affirmative action programs at company facilities in South Africa despite apartheid prac-
tices prohibiting such programs.  
 8. Allis-Chalmers Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 8871, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1974). In this 
case, the proposal requested the Board to divest 40,000 shares of the company’s common stock from 
a former executive. The executive acquired the shares as a part of his employment contract. Manage-
ment argued the proposal would result  in a breach of contract. 
 9. Newmont Mining Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1974 WL 6883 (March 27, 1974).  
 10. Id. 
 11. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976)  
 12. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976). 
 13. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Sec. Exch. Act of 1934 Relating to Pro-
posals by Sec. Holders (S7-643)., Release No. 9343 (proposed July 7, 1976). 
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The final rule permitted the exclusion of proposals that violated fed-
eral, state, and foreign law.14 However, the provision did not apply where 
the foreign law “would be violative of any state law or federal law of the 
United States.”15 Moreover, matters that depended upon interpretations of 
law, also required an opinion of counsel.16 
B.  Staff Interpretation 
In construing the exclusion, the staff sometimes rejected a company’s 
position because of an inadequate opinion of counsel. In one case, the staff 
noted that the company did not “quote the provision cited nor . . . provide 
any citations to any decided cases which would indicate that the proposed 
action would be illegal under that provision . . . .”17 Most notably, in no 
action letters issued after the amendments, the staff increasingly allowed 
for redrafting to cure a shareholder proposal that potentially resulted in a 
of law.  
1. State Law 
The exclusion applied to proposals that violated state statutes. For 
example, in letters issued to BankAmerica Corp. and Crocker Nat'l 
Corp.,18 shareholders submitted proposals that sought to require disclosure 
of information about the identity of their large investors. Management ar-
gued in both cases that confidentiality restrictions prohibited disclosure 
without the express consent of the individual account owners. The staff 
allowed for exclusion, agreeing that California law prohibited a trust com-
pany from “disclosing any information concerning the existence, condi-
tion, management and administration of any private trust confided to it.”19 
In General Motors Corp.,20 the staff permitted the omission of a 
shareholder proposal calling for the withholding of bonuses from employ-
ees following significant recalls of vehicles. Management pointed to New 
York law that authorized criminal prosecution for employers who refused 
to pay wages, benefits, or wage supplements when required. In a letter to 
  
 14. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. Holders, Release No. 12999 
(adopted Nov. 22, 1976). 
 15. The staff explained this language by example: “where a proposal would call for an action 
by the issuer to bring it into compliance with state or federal law, the fact that such action might be 
violative of a particular foreign law to which the issuer is also subject would not cause the proposal to 
be excluded under subparagraph (c)(2)”. Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Sec. 
Holders, Release No. 12999 (adopted Nov. 22, 1976). 
 16. See Rule 14a-8(d)(4) 17 CFR 240.14a-8(d)(4). See also Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-
8, Release No. 12734 (proposed Oct. 14, 1982) (noting that for exclusions under (c)(2), “the Commis-
sion staff requires an opinion of counsel”). 
 17. California Real Estate Inv. Trust, SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14299, at *1 (Mar. 27, 
1980).  
 18. BankAmerica Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13922, at *6 (Feb. 17, 1977); 
Crocker Nat'l Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 13924, at *1 (Feb. 17, 1977). 
 19. The Commission used the same language in both of these cases and a handful of other 
similar no action letters, which requested the same private information. Id.  
 20. Gen. Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 26256, at *1 (Mar. 6, 1981). 
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Proctor & Gamble,21 a proposal potentially violated the law by calling for 
the board to implement cumulative voting when the board did not have 
unilateral authority to do so. Management pointed out that statute required 
specific procedures (notice requirements) that the company could not im-
plement given the timing of the annual meeting. 
The exclusion also applied to proposals that violated a company’s 
bylaws and charter. In Time Warner Inc.,22 shareholders tried to amend 
the company’s bylaws to allow for cumulative voting. Management ar-
gued, however, that cumulative voting required amendment to the articles 
of incorporation. The staff agreed and allowed for exclusion of the pro-
posal. In Avondale Industries Inc.,23 shareholders wanted to amend the 
company’s bylaws to establish a Compensation Committee consisting of 
three independent directors. Management asserted that these changes 
would be inconsistent with the articles of incorporation. The staff agreed 
that a proposal calling for a bylaw that contravened the articles violated 
the state corporate law.  
Likewise, companies could exclude proposals that interfered with a 
board’s fiduciary obligations in violation of state law.24 In Bank America 
Corp., the proponents called for the formation of a shareholder committee 
to select replacements to fill board vacancies. Management argued that the 
proposal would divest them of their authority, under state law, to fill va-
cancies. The staff agreed that the proposal would “impermissibly” force 
the directors to “abdicate their responsibility to exercise best business 
judgement in filling future vacancies on the board by binding themselves 
to comply with the provisions of this proposal.”25 
In Lyondell Petrochemical Co.,26 a shareholder proposal specifically 
provided that the Union Representative for the company be chosen not by 
the Board in the exercise of its business judgment but by an appointment 
process in which the Board and the stockholders did not participate. Man-
agement argued that nominations were part of its responsibilities. The staff 
agreed, stating, “The Commission had previously recognized that a share-
holder proposal seeking to divest a board of directors of its responsibilit ies 
regarding nominations may be excluded . . . .”27  
  
 21. The Procter & Gamble Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1981 WL 25079, at *1 (July 1, 1981). 
 22. Time Warner Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1990 WL 286263, at *1 (Mar. 23, 1990). The 
staff did provide that the proposal could not be excluded if revised by the proponent within the speci-
fied time period. 
 23. Avondale Indus., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 WL 82754, at *1 (Feb. 28, 1995). 
 24. State law generally provided that the “business and affairs of a corporation” would be “man-
aged by or under the direction of a board of directors” Del. Code Ann. tit . 8, § 141(a). 
 25. Bank Am. Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1980 WL 14334, at *2 (Mar. 10, 1980). 
 26. Lyondell Petrochemical Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 47332, at *3 (Feb. 19, 1993). 
 27. See also the Growth Fund of Spain, SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 272422, at *7 (Mar. 
15, 1996) (exclusion of a proposal that could result  in a violation of the board’s fiduciary duties). 
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2. Federal Statutes and Rules 
The staff also allowed exclusion of proposals that violated federal 
statutes. Shareholders in Reserve Oil and Gas Co.28 submitted proposals 
seeking to avoid communist influence within the company by excluding 
people of specific national origins from the board of directors. The staff 
agreed with the management that discrimination of this sort was “clearly 
a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act . . . .”29 The Ford Motor 
Co.30 shareholders sought disclosure of outstanding defense contracts with 
the United States Government in connection with the Reagan Administra-
tion’s “Star Wars” Strategic Defense Initiative. Management argued that 
the information could be used in violation of national security and secrecy 
statutes.31 The Staff agreed that the proposal was excludable but allowed 
amendment to provide  
The staff also applied the exclusion to violations of federal rules and 
regulations. Shareholders in GE submitted a proposal that would prohibit 
the company, under certain circumstances, from sharing employee com-
pensation information with the Internal Revenue Service or other govern-
mental agencies. Management argued that the proposal would violate reg-
ulations issued by the Department of the Treasury.32 The staff agreed, con-
cluding that “properly adopted administrative regulations have the force 
and effect of law until rescinded by the agency, superseded by Congres-
sional action, or invalidated by a court of competent jurisdiction.”33  
3. Foreign Law 
Some no action letters involved allegations of violations of foreign 
law. In Standard Oil Co. of California,34 a shareholder proposal called for 
the company to stop selling petroleum products35 to the police and military 
forces of the South African government which imported nearly all its oil.  
Management argued that the proposal called for a “boycott of sales of 
products to the military and police of South Africa and would constitute a 
violation of the laws of the Republic of South Africa . . . .”36 The SEC 
Staff agreed and permitted exclusion. 
Companies sometimes obtained exclusion of proposals consistent 
with foreign, but inconsistent with United States law. In the Fort Motor 
  
 28. See also Signal Companies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1978 WL 13049, at *14 (Jan. 25, 
1978); Toledo Edison Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 13785, at *1 (Jan. 11, 1979). 
 29. Reserve Oil & Gas Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 WL 15065 (Feb. 28, 1977). 
 30. Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55898, at *1 (Apr. 11, 1985). 
 31. In this case, Section 793(d) of T itle 18 of the United States Code. 
 32. Specifically Treasury Regulation § 31–3402(f)(2)–1(g). 
 33. Gen. Elec. Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1984 WL 47201, at *2 (Jan. 13, 1984). 
 34. Standard Oil Co. of California, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30796, at *1 (Feb. 24, 
1983). 
 35. See also Texaco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66484, at *1 (Jan. 3, 1986). 
 36. Standard Oil Co. of California, SEC No-Action Letter, 1983 WL 30796, at *1 (Feb. 24, 
1983). 
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Co., and Am. Brands, Inc.,37 no action letters, proposals calling for the 
adoption of the McBride Principles in Northern Ireland38 had the potential 
effect of requiring the imposition of quotas or preferential treatment for 
underrepresented groups. Companies argued that the approach amounted 
to reverse discrimination, thereby conflicting with American law.39 The 
staff agreed that the requirements of United States law took precedence 
and therefore allowed exclusion.40 
C. Curing the Deficiency 
In some cases, the staff permitted shareholders to amend a proposal 
to avoid the application of the exclusion. In McDonnell Douglas Corp.,41 
a proposal sought to require the company's Board of Directors to nominate 
individuals selected by a minority group of stockholders. Management ar-
gued that this usurped their business judgement in violation of Maryland 
law.42 The staff agreed but allowed shareholders to amend the proposal to 
provide that the employee-nominee would not be considered to be a nom-
inee of the Board of Directors. 
In Equimark Corporation.,43 a proposal sought to amend the com-
pany’s by-laws to change the company's executive termination policy. 
Management argued that the proposal was inconsistent with the com-
pany’s contractual obligations and therefore violated state contract law. 
The staff agreed but allowed shareholders to revise the proposal to avoid 
violating the articles.44 
The staff has sometimes permitted revisions that rendered the pro-
posal precatory. In Marriott International Inc.,45 a proposal would have 
required the board of directors to amend the company’s Articles of Incor-
  
 37. Ford Motor Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 66540, at *1 (Mar. 19, 1986); Am. 
Brands, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 55910, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1985); 
 38. These consisted of nine fair employment principles which served as a corporate code of 
conduct for United States companies doing business in Northern Ireland. Investment Responsibility in 
Northern Ireland: The MacBride Principles of Fair Employment Neil J. Conway 
 39. In both cases management asserted that “such action would mean a person from another 
religious group would be treated less favorably than a person from an under represented religious 
group.” The staff agreed, reasoning “[these] proposals seem to imply positive discrimination and leg-
islation in the US and UK at the time provided for equality of opportunity and outlawed preferential 
treatment, including positive discrimination.” Id.  
 40. See also Fruehauf Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 65334, at *4 (Mar. 5, 1986). 
 41. McDonnell Douglas Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1993 WL 87870, at *1 (Mar. 23, 1993). 
 42. Specifically, section 2–401(a) of the Maryland General Corporation Law provides that 
“[t]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed under the direction of the Board.” 
 43. Equimark Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 76,108 (Feb. 13, 1992). 
 44. In this case, the staff said the defect could be cured if the proposal were revised to apply 
only to future employment contracts and to be limited to a request or recommendation that the Com-
pany's Board of Directors take the steps necessary to implement the proposal. Id. 
 45. Marriot Int'l, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 97656, at *1 (Mar. 5, 1998). 
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poration to add a provision mandating abstention by the officers and di-
rectors from making certain decisions.46 Management argued that this 
would usurp board discretion and violate the law. The staff allowed re-
drafting of the proposal to be precatory in nature. In Kmart Corp.,47 share-
holders wanted to amend the company’s Articles of Incorporation to elim-
inate staggered terms for directors. Management asserted that the proposal 
would cause the company to breach existing contractual obligations by 
prematurely shortening the terms of existing directors. The staff reasoned, 
“The defects could be cured, if the proposals were redrafted to be advisory 
. . . .”48 
III. 14A-8(I)(2) AND THE NEW MILLENNIUM  
The Commission rewrote Rule 14a-8 into plain English in 1998. With 
respect to the exclusion for conflicts with the law, the Commission 
adopted only minor revisions and otherwise left the regulation un-
changed.49 The provision continued to apply to proposals that would result 
in a violation of “any state, federal, or foreign law” and the staff still per-
mitted modifications to proposals that would allow them to avoid applica-
tion of the subsection.  
A.  Claims for Violations of State Law Post 1998  
Violations of state law remained one of the most common grounds 
for exclusion. However, to the extent that the basis for exclusion involved 
a board’s fiduciary obligations or the authority of shareholders, resolution 
was often not easy. State law had few decisions in the area. Moreover, in 
some cases, shareholders could obtain an opinion of counsel opposite that 
of management’s.  
In one case, the CA, Inc.,50 the Commission sought to resolve the 
predicament by ying the Delaware Supreme Court. In this case, the pro-
posal recommended an amendment of the bylaws to provide procedures 
for reimbursement of reasonable expenses incurred by shareholders in 
connection with the nomination of a candidate to the board.51 Management 
argued that the provision would, effectively vest in the stockholders, rather 
  
 46. In this case the board could not of its own accord amend the company's charter. Instead, in 
order for the charter to be amended, the board had to determine the advisability of the amendment then 
submit the matter to shareholders.  
 47. Kmart Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 97543, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1998).SEC No-Action 
Letter,  
 48. Id.  
 49. The Commission renumbered the subsection from (c)(2) to (i)(2). 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(2). 
 50. Ca, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *5 (June 27, 2008). 
 51. The petition to the Court can be found here 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2008/ca14a8cert.pdf. 
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than the board the ability to manage the business and conduct the affairs 
of the corporation.52 Shareholders, however, disagreed.53  
The Delaware Supreme Court granted review.54 The court found that 
the proposal was a proper subject for shareholders but that e not obligation 
to reimburse costs could infringe on the ability of directors “to discharge 
their fiduciary duties.”55 Following the decision, the Commission permit-
ted exclusion. 
Proposals that resulted in violations of articles of incorporation or 
bylaws also continued to be subject to exclusion. In Boeing Co.56 share-
holders wanted to mandate that every corporate action requiring share-
holder approval be adopted by a simple majority vote of shares. Manage-
ment asserted that this would “result in violations of the company's 
own bylaws” and constituted a violation of Delaware law. The staff agreed 
with management and allowed exclusion of the proposal.57  
B.  Claims for Violation of Federal Statutes and Rules Post 1998  
Some letters turned on possible violations of federal statutes and 
rules. In Pfizer,58 a shareholder proposal sought to amend the bylaws to 
provide that parties must use arbitration to settle certain controversies or 
claims, including those arising under federal securities laws. Pfizer argued 
that the proposal would actually violate federal securities law by prevent-
ing any shareholder claim already subject to arbitration.59 The staff agreed 
and permitted exclusion of the proposal. 
  
 52. Ca, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2568454, at *5 (June 27, 2008). 
 53. Shareholders argued that because the bylaw concerned the process of the nomination and 
election of directors, it  was an appropriate subject matter for shareholder action under established 
Delaware law. “Delaware courts have long exercised a most sensitive and protective regard for the 
free and effective exercise of voting rights.” Ca, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 2008 WL 
2724908 (Del.Supr.). 
 54. The Supreme Court of Delaware reasoned that “The Division was thus confronted with two 
conflicting legal opinions on Delaware law. Whether or not the Division would determine that CA 
may exclude the proposed Bylaw from its 2008 proxy materials would depend upon which of these 
conflicting views is legally correct. To obtain guidance, the SEC, at the Division's request, certified 
two questions of Delaware law to this Court. Given the short t imeframe for the filing of CA's proxy 
materials, we concluded that there are important and urgent reasons for an immediate determination 
of the questions certified, and accepted those questions for review.” 
 55. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 236 (Del. 2008). 
 56. The Boeing Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 114380, at *1 (Mar. 4, 1999). Boeing’s 
bylaws required a majority vote of all outstanding shares, not merely those present.  
 57. See also AT&T, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 485463, at *15 (Feb. 19, 2008). In 
that case, shareholders recommended that the company implement cumulative voting by means of a 
corporate bylaw or policy. The staff reasoned that Delaware General Corporation Law allowed cumu-
lative voting only if it  was authorized in the company’s certificate of incorporation. Even if the pro-
posal were changed to request an amendment of the certificate to implement a cumulative voting 
scheme, AT&T could not commit to implement it because any such amendment must first be adopted 
and declared advisable by the Board and then submitted to the stockholders for their approval. 
 58. Pfizer Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2012 WL 587597 (Feb. 22, 2012). 
 59. This would violate Section 29 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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Conversely, in the Charles Schwab Corp.60 no action letter, a share-
holder proposal requested a comprehensive breakdown of the company’s 
workforce by race and gender. The company stated the proposal was im-
proper because it called for disclosure of private data in violation of federal 
statutes. The staff disagreed noting that the proposal only requested vol-
untary disclosure.  
C. Curing the Proposal  
Even when the staff agreed on the exclusion of a proposal, it often 
continued to give specific instructions on how to remedy the problem and 
a timeframe (usually seven days) to complete the revision. From 1998 until 
2016, the staff permitted the exclusion of about 200 proposals under sub-
section (i)(2).61 In sixty-eight of the letters (33.33%), the staff provided 
advice on how to cure the deficiency.62  
In Anthem,63 a proposal asked that the company take the steps nec-
essary to reorganize the board into one class with each director subject to 
annual election. Management stated this would cause Anthem to breach 
existing contractual obligations. The staff agreed but advised that if the 
company revised the proposal within seven days to state that it would defer 
its implementation until it would not interfere with Anthem's existing con-
tractual obligations, management could not exclude the matter.  
In Exelon,64 shareholders proposed that the board of directors and the 
compensation committee limit the compensation for each named executive 
officer to one hundred times the median annual total compensation paid to 
all employees of the company. Management argued the proposal would 
cause Exelon to impermissibly restrict the ability of its Board of Directors 
to determine the level and form of compensation for certain Exelon exec-
utive officers and to establish compensation plans in violation of the pro-
visions of state law. The staff advised that if the proposal were recast as a 
recommendation or request to the board of directors, it would not neces-
sarily require a violation of law. The staff provided that the proposal seven 
calendar days.  
IV.  ANALYSIS AND OVERALL INTERPRETATION OF STAFF DECISIONS  
The exclusion for violations of the law has proved difficult to use. 
Companies generally must obtain an opinion of counsel demonstrating the 
violation. In addition, shareholders have an equal right to do so. The staff, 
  
 60. The Charles Schwab Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2014 WL 69538, at *1 (Jan. 2, 2014). 
 61. Using the search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “appears to be some basis”). 
 62. Using search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “appears to be some basis” & “could be cured”). 
 63. Anthem, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2015 WL 139351, at *1 (Mar. 4, 2015). 
 64. Exelon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 2013 WL 6355921, at *1 (Nov. 26, 2013). 
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therefore, often confronts areas difficult to interpret with conflicting opin-
ions of counsel. Given the uncertainty, the staff has routinely allowed 
shareholders to revise the proposal to ensure that no violation occurs.  
The statistics bear this out. From 1998 through early 2016, the staff 
was “unable to concur” that a company could exclude a proposal under 
(i)(2) in over 300 no action letters.65 During the same period, the Staff 
permitted the exclusion of around 200 proposals. Approximately one-third 
of the excluded proposals were subject to cure.66  
Recent statistics suggest that the exclusion is used infrequently. In 
2015, the staff allowed for the exclusion of only eight proposals under the 
subsection67 and offered advice on how to cure the defect in four of these.68 
The staff permitted the exclusion of three proposals in 2014 with none 
suggesting a cure69 and five in 2013 with one permitting a cure.70  
Even if rarely used, the exclusion remains important. Most im-
portantly, however, the exclusion demonstrates the importance of Staff 
flexibility in the enforcement of Rule 14a-8. Unlike almost all other ex-
clusions, the Staff under subsection (i)(2) routinely allows investors to 
“cure” a proposal. The exclusion demonstrates that many shareholders can 
avoid exclusion through modest revisions to a proposal. Perhaps the lesson 





 65. Using the search terms (14a-8(i)(2)) /20 “unable to concur”). 
 66. See Supra note 64 
 67. See Chart http://www.law.du.edu/documents/corporate-governance/empirical/Rule-14a-8-
i-2-Chart.pdf. 
 68. See supra note 67  
 69. See supra note 67 
 70. See supra note 67 
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